Logistics

In the early stages of the CIDG program, the U.S. Mission in Saigon employed a flexible and militarily unorthodox system to supply CIDG camps. The Army adopted many of these methods to provide a system of logistics unique in U.S. military history. It was not part of the U.S. Military Assistance Program for Vietnam, and it was independent of Military Assistance Advisory Group and Vietnam Army control. Funding was handled under a phase of the Operation SWITCHBACK program called PARASOL-SWITCHBACK. Under PARASOL-SWITCHBACK, funds for the CIDG program were received by Special Forces headquarters in Vietnam. The U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Support Office was established on Okinawa on 27 February 1963 and assigned the mission of supporting the Special Forces programs through triservice depots and local procurement sources and accounting for the PARASOL-SWITCHBACK funds expended outside Vietnam. Many items of clothing and equipment, for example, had to be obtained from markets in other countries because of size problems, composition of material, and equipment which had to be tailored to Montagnard measurements. Funds for procurement and salaries of civilian irregulars in Vietnam were accounted for by Special Forces headquarters.

There were ten key features of the Special Forces logistical system for the CIDG program.

1. Control of material, transportation, and funds (including CIDG troop pay) was kept in U.S. hands down to the point of issue to the ultimate users.

2. Local purchases of goods and services were authorized at all levels, with cash from current operating funds.

3. Requisitioning, justification, stock control, and other procedures were, initially at least, simple and informal.

4. Deliveries of equipment and supplies to A detachments from higher echelons were made from the Logistical Support Center at Nha Trang directly to the A detachments.

5. Air transportation, with supplies landed or dropped, was the predominant method of delivery.

6. Maintenance by replacement took the place of repairing equipment on the site.

7. A special Counterinsurgency Support Office was established in Headquarters, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, Okinawa, to control and expedite Special Forces external logistical support.

8. U.S. balance-of-payments control regulations were waived, permitting unlimited direct overseas procurement.

9. A special "quick-reacting supply and procurement" procedure was devised to provide quick procurement service in the United States for unusual needs.

10. Formal accountability was dropped on shipment of material to the Special Forces, and justification of requests was not required above the level of the Special Forces operational base.

Rations for CIDG troops, petroleum products, and other goods used on a daily basis were obtained in Vietnam through local and central procurement. Construction materials, labor, and services were also largely procured and paid for locally. Rations for American military personnel along with standard equipment and supplies were obtained from the U.S. Army Support Group and later U.S. Army, Vietnam, and the U.S. commissary in Saigon, and were supplemented by local purchases at each echelon.

The Special Forces Logistical Supply Center at Nha Trang aimed at keeping a sixty-day stock level of standard-issue items and those special items that had in effect become standard for the CIDG program, for example, uniforms and jungle boots for CIDG troops. Three of the four B detachments maintained emergency five-day stocks, particularly of ammunition and medical supplies. Because of the bad weather prevailing in I Corps during the monsoon, the forward supply point at the B detachment at Da Nang kept fifteenday stocks. Over 9,000 line items of all classes of supplies were handled. In the last three months of 1964, a monthly average of 1,335 tons was distributed from the center at Nha Trang, of which 1,245 tons were delivered by air.

The most significant organizational change in the logistics system during this period was the establishment of forward supply points, like the one at Da Nang in I Corps and at the other B detachment headquarters in Pleiku, Saigon, and Can Tho. At each of these points a five-day emergency stock was maintained for A detachments. Four basic advantages were derived from the employment of the forward supply points in each corps tactical zone: aircraft could be used to the maximum extent, the response time to subordinate detachments' requests was reduced, the stockpile was dispersed, and a more effective use was made of sea lift.